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Purpose of this Document 
This document is the Security View for the e-enablement of the Common Assessment 
Form (eCAF).  Its purpose is to communicate the security requirements applicable to 
eCAF implementations. 
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1. eCAF Documentation Reader’s Guide 
A number of documents define the requirements of the e-enabled Common Assessment 
Framework System (eCAF).  The diagram below gives an overview of these documents 
and their relationship to each other.  Notes below the diagram describe the purpose of 
each document. 
 
Figure 1 – eCAF Document Route Map 
 
The eCAF document set comprises: 
- eCAF Overview – Essential starting point and executive summary. Introduces the 
other documents in the set.  
- The CAF Scenario – This document walks through a “story”, showing an example of 
how the CAF Business Processes might work in practice. Useful for all readers, to 
gain a basic familiarity with CAF process. 
- The CAF Business Processes – This document describes the people and business 
activities that are required to complete a Common Assessment and the subsequent 
actions arising out of that Assessment.  It also indicates where IT support from an 
eCAF system will assist these activities.  
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- The Requirements Catalogue – This document defines what system support is 
required by practitioners using the Common Assessment Framework (CAF).  It 
contains categorised listings of functional and non-functional requirements. 
- The Security Architecture – This document defines in more detail the security 
requirements for an eCAF system. This is a critical aspect, and thus worthy of 
specific consideration. 
- The Use Case Survey – This document presents the requirements as Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) Use Case diagrams. This may be useful for more 
technical readers, for example to inform the Inception and Elaboration stages of a 
Rational Unified Process (RUP) development project. 
- The Interfaces View – This document provides more information about the 
interfacing requirements for an eCAF system. Interfacing is important but potentially 
complex, so this document provides additional guidance.  
- The Data Model – This document contains a high-level diagram of the information 
that will be required in the context of CAF.  It provides a more detailed view of 
information requirements in the form of an Entity Relationship Diagram that defines 
the essential eCAF data items and their relationships.  It also includes a set of Data 
Classifications which summarise the types of data used in CAF, such as Name and 
Contact Details.   It provides standard names and definitions that will be used by an 
eCAF system. 
- The XML Schema – This is a technical schema specification (plus example xml file), 
providing a standard representation of the Data Model as an XML (GovTalk) 
message. XML is a widely accepted data format used for information exchange 
between systems.   
- The Root Cause Model – This document describes the root causes of the main 
issues which prevent the delivery of the targeted outcomes of the ‘Every Child 
Matters: Change for Children’ Programme (relevant to initial assessments).  It states 
both the business challenges faced (the issues and their root causes) and the 
business need to be addressed. 
- The Benefits/Requirements Map – This document provides the linkage between 
the root causes eCAF looks to address and the solution components (requirements) 
designed to address them. 
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2. Introduction 
eCAF is a framework for assessing children’s needs and for coordinating multi-agency 
responses to them.  An eCAF implementation will record details of episodes in a child’s 
life, which will be accessible by a number of interested agencies such as schools, health 
professionals and the Police. 
eCAF information is sensitive and must be protected properly from unauthorised access.  
This document describes what protection is required and also gives guidance on 
achieving a usable and interoperable implementation. 
This document only covers the application-level protection of personal data.  It does not 
address the general infrastructure security measures, such as firewalls and virus 
protection, that any responsible IT-aware organisation should already have. 
If eCAF implementation is delegated to local authorities then the eCAF architecture 
(including this security architecture) will not be mandatory, and will be guidance only.  
Local authorities that choose not to conform to it should, however, take advice as to how 
they will meet their legal obligations in the information security area. 
Note that this document focuses on the “what”, in terms of security requirements for an 
eCAF system. It leaves open a number of options for the “how”, in terms of the security 
infrastructure to achieve these requirements.  
Other Every Child Matters projects (such as the IS Index) are also intending to publish 
security requirements and guidance in the near future. This should be reviewed, when 
available, to ensure a compatible approach to any infrastructure solution. 
2.1 Audience 
This document is intended for security architects and analysts who are working on an 
eCAF implementation.  It may also be of interest to business and IT managers, data 
protection officers, and others responsible for data and system security. 
It gives guidance about: 
• The minimum security level that eCAF implementations should achieve, that is, 
the security countermeasures that should be employed. 
• How to address some of the common usability and integration issues that can 
arise with secure systems. 
2.2 Structure 
Chapter 3 contains general background information that is of interest to security 
practitioners.  Much of this information is available in other documents. 
Chapter 4 contains the security background facts that drive the security requirements.  
This includes information about the legislation and policy that should be followed, the 
assets to be protected, and the users it should be protected from. 
Chapter 5 then describes the security services that should be provided and gives 
detailed requirements for each. 
E-enablement of the Common Assessment Framework 
eCAF Security Architecture 
  
 
Version 1.0                                         
Page 8 of 27 
 
Chapter 6 gives guidance on achieving interoperability and usability for (and between) 
eCAF implementations. 
E-enablement of the Common Assessment Framework 
eCAF Security Architecture 
  
 
Version 1.0                                         
Page 9 of 27 
 
3. General Background 
3.1 Organisations Involved 
The DfES is a UK central government department.  It sets targets and policy for UK 
schools and monitors conformance to these. 
The DfES has initiated the development of CAF and eCAF.   
eCAF may be implemented centrally or, more likely, individually by each local authority 
in England.  Any body that implements eCAF will be responsible for operating the 
implementation. 
eCAF users will come from any of the organisations involved in child care and protection, 
such as: 
• Local authorities. 
• The Police. 
• Healthcare professionals (GPs, midwives, other professionals). 
• Schools and other organisations involved in education. 
• Voluntary organisations (such as Barnados). 
Where eCAF implementation is delegated, because each type of organisation will have 
different geographical boundaries, there will be a need either for eCAF implementations 
to synchronise data to give their users a complete view, or for users to access several 
different eCAF implementations.  Also, eCAF implementations will need to share data 
when data subjects move around the country. 
The total population of eCAF users is expected to be around 200,000. 
3.2 The eCAF Process 
eCAF provides a generic process for addressing needs.  This process is in three stages: 
• Preparation, to decide whether a full assessment should be performed and to 
determine the agencies involved. 
• Discussion, perform an assessment of the child’s needs.  This can be done either 
by a single agency or by multiple agencies.  A set of action points will be agreed 
for the agencies to perform. 
• Delivery, complete the agreed action points. 
Assessments can be performed for children aged up to 18, for people with special needs 
up to 25, and for unborn children. 
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4. Security Drivers 
4.1 Applicable Regulations 
The principal legislation that eCAF is concerned with is as follows: 
• The Data Protection Act (DPA).  Personally identifiable data concerning children 
comes within the scope of this act.  The act requires data holders to be registered 
with the Information Commissioner, and to apply eight data protection principles.  
These include - 
o Data must be protected in a way that reflects the harm that its 
compromise could cause. 
o Data must be collected with the subject’s consent and must be distributed 
and processed with the subject’s consent. 
o Data subjects have the right to view what is stored relating to them. 
• The Freedom of Information Act (FIA).  This allows citizens to make information 
access requests on government data.  Part of the FIA requirements would be met 
by conforming to the DPA, the remainder should be met using an organisation’s 
existing FIA measures.  Therefore the FIA will not be considered further here. 
In order to encourage the growth of eCommerce, the eEnvoy has developed an 
eGovernment Security Framework that specifies security requirements for g2c e-
commerce.  This specifies 4 levels of requirement for the following security services: 
• Confidentiality 
• Registration 
• Authentication. 
• Non-repudiation. 
Each eGovernment security service must protect its services at the right level.  The 
meaning of the levels is as follows: 
• Level 0 is for public data and requires no special security (other than availability) 
• Level 1 is for data that is not public but would cause little damage if 
compromised, for instance name and address. 
• Level 2 is for data which is private and must only be given to known individuals.  
For instance, tax returns. 
• Level 3 is for data which is sensitive and must be protected against accidental or 
casual compromise.  This is equivalent to the RESTRICTED protective marking.  
For instance, medical records. 
4.2 Actor Types 
eCAF must cater for the following types of human user: 
• Practitioner users.  These access an eCAF implementation in a professional 
capacity to carry out or advise on an agency’s response to a child’s needs.  
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There are two types of practitioner user, depending upon the way they are 
managed: 
o Personal users.  These are people who have legitimate individual access 
to an eCAF implementation.  However, they are not given access by an 
employer. 
o Sponsored users.  These users are registered and managed by an 
authorized body (such as a Police force or a local authority) which 
sponsors their access. 
An episode team will be made up from practitioner users.  The eCAF 
Requirements Catalog partitions practitioner users into CA Episode 
Administrators, Contributing Practitioners, Viewing Practitioners and Supervisors.  
These are different roles that a practitioner can have with respect to a particular 
episode.  
• System administrators.  These administer an eCAF application or its hosting 
infrastructure using operating system and database facilities.  They will 
administer the eCAF users.  Each application or operating system is likely to be 
managed by a different class of administrator, each with its own permission set.  
System administrators can be practitioners as well but, given the different skill 
sets involved, this situation will not be common in practice. 
• Developers.  These test and develop eCAF applications and implementations. 
• Citizens.  These are children and those associated with them. 
o Children.  These are the children whose details are recorded in an eCAF 
implementation. 
o Carers.  These are people (normally parents) with a legal responsibility for 
a child. 
o Others (could include family members). 
Note that direct access to eCAF by citizens is considered out of scope as a 
business requirement.  This does not mean that such access is forbidden, but it 
does mean that the security measures required are not defined in this document. 
• Data subject.  A data subject is someone who has personal data recorded within 
eCAF (which can include practitioners and citizens).  Both practitioners and 
citizens can be data subjects. 
• Consentor.  This is someone who consents for a data subject’s data to be stored 
and processed within eCAF.  In most cases this will be the data subject himself 
but where the subject is not legally competent, it can be the carer or some other 
person. 
An eCAF implementation is likely to interoperate with the following types of external 
system: 
• Other eCAF systems. 
• Other applications, such as case management tools, operated by authorized 
bodies as described in Section 3.1. 
• The Index System, an index of children being developed independently under the 
auspices of the DFES.  The Index System will have contact details each child 
and a marker indicating whether the child is handled in a CAF system. 
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4.3 Security Domains 
We need to consider a range of areas from which an eCAF implementation can be 
accessed: 
• Authorised body premises and networks. 
• Mobile access, Internet access and access from insecure areas.  Additional 
countermeasures will be required for access from or across such as domain. 
4.4 Data Classifications 
It is critical that a proper balance is found between the need to protect eCAF data, and 
the cost/inconvenience of doing so.   The first step to achieving this balance is to 
understand the importance of the data being protected. 
In this document we will follow the ‘e-Government Strategy Framework Policy and 
Guidelines’ standards issued by the Cabinet Office.  These standards describe how to 
categorize the requirements for each of the 4 security objectives (confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and non-repudiation), see 4.1.  They do so by measuring the impact 
of a compromise to each objective.  This leads to 4 separate ‘values’ for each piece of 
data.  Each ‘value’ then guides the implementation of a set of security services. 
4.4.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is a property of data, that it has not been revealed to the wrong people.  
The following table indicates the confidentiality levels for the broad categories of eCAF 
data. 
 
Data Type Confidentiality Level 
Episode and episode item data Level 3 
Episode role data Level 3 
Contact details for children, carers 
and practitioners. 
By default, these details will be at level 2. 
However, some (for instance, children of VIPs) 
will be more sensitive (level 3).  A facility is 
required for marking such records. 
Organisation details Level 0 
Relationships between parties By default, these details will be at level 2.   
However, some will be sensitive, for instance, 
the identity of a child’s father may be sensitive in 
some cases, and links to particular types of 
practitioner will allow inferences to be made 
about episodes.  A facility is required to mark 
certain links as sensitive. 
Access Control Lists (ACLs) and 
Additional Access Decisions (AADs) 
Level 3 
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Audit logs Level 3 
 
What this table states is that episode data is about as sensitive as medical records, that 
is, that a high level of protection is required for them.  Role relationships are equally 
sensitive because they could allow inferences to be made about a child’s problems.  
Most contact details, however, are less sensitive (while still not being public). 
4.4.2 Integrity 
Integrity is a property of data, that it is correct and has not been tampered with.  All the 
eCAF data is at an integrity level of 3. 
4.4.3 Availability 
Availability is a property of data, that is available when needed and has not been 
deleted.  Each eCAF implementer must carefully consider what level of availability 
protection is required for its data, for instance, what recovery time would be acceptable 
in the case of a disaster. 
4.4.4 Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation is a property of data, that it is not merely correct, but can be 
demonstrated to be correct to a third party, such as a court of law in a criminal 
prosecution. 
Non-repudiation is not a requirement for eCAF because eCAF will not be the only source 
of information about how a child’s needs were analysed or addressed – for instance, 
information can be gleaned from other applications, formal communications, and 
personal recollections. 
eCAF implementers can, of course, choose to implement non-repudiation services if they 
wish, though the costs can be considerable. 
4.5 Privacy and Consent 
The most important security driver for eCAF is the Data Protection Act which requires 
data subjects to give consent before their personal data is stored and processed in an 
information system (see 4.1). 
The detailed process for child data is specified in the eCAF Business Processes 
specification and a summary is given below. 
Every episode is associated with an assessment describing the child’s needs and the 
actions to be taken to meet those needs.  The assessment includes a section to record 
consent by or on behalf of a data subject. 
Consent could be a blanket consent, a collection of tick boxes indicating the agencies 
that may receive the data, or a natural language narrative describing the data subject’s 
detailed requirements.  These can be arbitrarily complex.  Consent is recorded by having 
a paper printout of the assessment form signed by, or on behalf of, the data subject. 
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In most cases the child (or his carer) will be given a copy of the assessment form.  This 
can be refused if the child could be harmed as a result. 
Each episode may have a number of users with access rights assigned: 
• Full Control – able to update the Episode data and also to manage access rights 
for other users. This is intended primarily for the Episode Coordinator - the 
human user who is ultimately responsible for the episode. However the Episode 
Owner may also choose to grant this access right to other practitioners, so that 
they can deputise as “Episode Administrators”.   
• Update – able to update the Episode data, but NOT to manage access rights for 
other users. This access right may be assigned by the Episode Owner to allow 
other practitioners working closely with the child to add information to the 
Episode themselves 
• Read Only – the default for practitioners other than the Episode Coordinator.  
Able to view the Episode data but not to make changes. 
Every episode is associated with an Access Control List (ACL), and with any number of 
Additional Access Decisions (AAD).  An episode’s ACL is an interpretation of the natural 
language consent agreed with the data subject, and gives access to members of the 
episode team.  An AAD covers any additional access requirement, such as one-time 
access by someone not in the episode team, or access granted without the data 
subject’s consent.  In the latter case, an AAD must be justified by one of the waivers 
specified within the Data Protection Act, and the justification will be recorded along with 
the AAD.  The use of AADs should be exceptional.  An AAD should be time-limited; ACL 
entries can be time limited. 
ACL entries and AADs are controlled by episode administrators. 
Every episode is associated with an access log that records read and write access to the 
assessment and changes to the ACL and AADs. 
Note that eCAF will contain some personal data (mainly contact details) about 
practitioners.  Since practitioners need to use eCAF in order to perform their jobs, they 
do not need to explicitly give consent for their data to be stored.  (Note: a legal opinion 
may be required to confirm this). 
4.6 Security Services 
eCAF implementations should protect data by implementing the following security 
services: 
• Registration (the process of adding users to the system). 
• Authentication (the process of checking user identities). 
• Access control (restricting access to data). 
• Audit (recording user activity). 
• Encryption (scrambling data to make it unusable). 
Chapter 5 specifies full requirements for each service.  It also briefly discusses security 
infrastructure requirements. 
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5. Security Services 
Here we specify requirements for each of the services listed in Section 4.6. 
5.1 Registration 
Registration is the process of creating eCAF users, administering them, and removing 
them. 
It is very important that individuals’ identities are checked before they are given access 
to eCAF.  We will use the eGovernment Security Framework which defines 4 registration 
levels, 0-3, with level 0 involving no identity checking and level 3 involving the most 
rigorous checks.  Refer to ‘HMG's Minimum Requirements for the Verification of the 
Identity of Individuals’ for details of each level.  A similar set of criteria has been defined 
for checking the identity of an organisation. 
The following checks must be performed for eCAF users: 
• Practitioner users must have their identities checked at level 3.  They must also 
produce documentary evidence for their practitioner status, for instance, 
academic qualifications or an employment contract.  They must also be subjected 
to a Criminal Background Review and must be checked against the sex offenders 
register.  
• System administrators must have their identities checked at level 3.  They must 
also be subjected to a Criminal Background Review and must be checked 
against the sex offenders register. 
• Developers do not require identity checks. 
• Data subjects must have their identities checked at level 3 before being given 
electronic access to an episode.  Carers must have their identities checked at 
level 3, and must show documentary evidence of their relationship to a child, 
before being given electronic access to a child’s episode. 
Any organisation that wishes to sponsor staff must have its identity checked at level 3. 
The registration process will: 
• Verify the user’s identity and status. 
• Obtain the user’s agreement to abide by the system’s conditions of use. 
• Ensure that the user has sufficient training and knowledge to use the system 
correctly. 
• Provide the user with a credential (such as a token or a password) that can be 
used to logon to the system. 
• Give the user the necessary privileges to use the system. 
A process will be required to renew or replace a lost credential.  A user’s identity must be 
checked as part of the process.  Where the old credential is still working, this can be 
used; if it is lost or malfunctioning, it may be necessary to repeat the registration-time 
identity check. 
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Practitioner users and system administrators must have their access revoked when they 
terminate their employment or stop working in a practitioner or system administrator 
capacity.  This is normally done by removing their access permissions, revoking their 
credentials and disabling their userID.  Ideally this should be done automatically as part 
of the leaving process.  Where automation is not possible, a manual de-registration 
process must be defined, supplemented by a periodic check, performed every 6 months, 
whereby managers reassess their users’ access requirements and rescind any access 
which is no longer required. 
5.2 Authentication 
The eGovernment Security Framework defines 4 levels of authentication: 
• Level 0 – no authentication. 
• Level 1 – basic strength authentication.  A password is required which shall be 
stored and transmitted encrypted.  A minimum password length of 8 characters is 
required.  Users may select any password subject to the length requirement.  
Users may change their password.  Passwords must be changed every 90 days. 
• Level 2 – certificate or (deprecated) password. 
• Level 3 – high strength authentication using a hardware token. 
Where data is being accessed over the Internet, the authentication level required is the 
same as the confidentiality level for the data.  So, level 3 authentication is required in 
order to access an episode over the Internet. 
Where level 3 data is being accessed internally, a token is still preferred, but it is not 
mandated, and a password (level 2 authentication) is acceptable.  For this to apply: 
• The whole of the network between the system and the user must be trusted, that 
is, it must be physically secure and it must be managed by the eCAF operator or 
a trusted organisation. 
• The user must be working within the eCAF operator’s premises or those of a 
trusted organisation.  In particular, the user must not be mobile or working from 
home. 
• Where an eCAF system permits both internal and Internet access, it must be able 
to clearly distinguish the two though network architecture or firewall rules. 
5.3 Access control 
Unauthenticated users must not be given access to an eCAF implementation. 
The access rules for authenticated users are as follows: 
Developers 
• Developers must not be given access to a live eCAF service. 
Practitioners 
• Practitioners may read or append episodes where consent has been given or 
where a waiver to the Data Protection Act applies (see 4.5).  Access to an 
episode gives read access to its access log, ACL and AADs. 
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• Practitioners may access any non-sensitive (level 2) relationship.  For sensitive 
(level 3) relationships, practitioners may read or change relationships that relate 
to an episode they have access to. 
• Practitioners may read contact details for any non-sensitive (level 2) party. For 
sensitive (level 3) parties, practitioners may read or change contact details for 
parties that relate to an episode they have access to. 
• A privileged subset of practitioners may view access logs for any episode. 
• A privileged subset of practitioners may create AADs, or nominate additional 
episode administrators, for any episode. 
System Administrators 
• A privileged subset of system administrators may change reference data. 
• A privileged subset of system administrators may create, administer and delete 
practitioner users and system administrators. 
• It is forbidden to change or delete access logs, but a privileged subset of system 
administrators may archive them. 
• A privileged subset of system administrators may archive episodes. 
• System administrators are not permitted access to any level 3 data.  Note that it 
is often difficult to enforce this rule in practice, so it may be necessary to develop 
contractual usage conditions for these users. 
Citizens 
• Citizens may usually access their own contact details, episodes and relationships 
electronically or in paper form. 
• Carers may usually access their child’s contact details, episodes and 
relationships electronically or in paper form. 
• Exceptionally, the episode coordinator may decide that these accesses are not in 
the child’s interest, in which case he will give less or no access. 
All users 
• Reference data is public and may be read by any user. 
• Organisation data is public and may be read by any user. 
Episode items are never modified.  However a user may append new episode items.  
Each episode item is associated with the user who added it and with a timestamp for 
when the addition was made.  It is important that the timestamp and userID are 
protected from tampering. 
When eCAF exchanges data with another program (including another eCAF): 
• If the program is untrusted it will act with the privileges of the invoking user or the 
group of users on whose behalf it operates. 
• If the program is trusted it will act with the privileges of an application-specific 
userID.  A ‘trusted’ program is one which obeys the rules defined within this 
security architecture.   
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Once data has been transferred to a foreign trusted program, the episode administrators 
within that program are responsible for ensuring that the ACL within that program 
accurately reflects the existing consent statement and that AADs are granted under 
proper waivers.  Note that as soon as an episode is stored in more than one program, 
there is a danger that the versions of the episode will start to diverge.  This can be 
addressed by synchronizing the versions, or by designating one as the master and 
making the other read-only and marking it as historical. 
5.4 Audit 
Each system user must be associated with enough information to allow him to be 
contacted. 
The following events shall be audited: 
• All changes to data and relationships. 
• Read access to level 3 data. 
• Import and export events. 
• Archive events. 
The following information must be recorded with each audit record: 
• The identity of the user involved (this must identify a human user; a group or 
organisation is not acceptable). 
• The time. 
• Sufficient data about the record changed or examined to uniquely identify the 
episode concerned. 
• Where access is obtained under a waiver (i.e. an AAD), the reason for the 
waiver. 
Note that, where a change is made, there is no requirement to audit a complete 
description of the change (i.e. what the record looked like before and after the change). 
Note that where an episode is accessed in more than one program, each program must 
follow the audit rules.  In addition, the audit logs generated by all the programs must be 
consolidated together in one place so they can be examined in a unified way. 
5.5 Encryption 
Data at confidentiality level 2 or above must be encrypted when in transit over the 
Internet or any insecure network.  Data at confidentiality level 3 must be encrypted when 
in transit outside a secure data centre. 
Note that encryption is not required for confidentiality level 3 (or lower) data in transit 
over a network which has been formally accredited to RESTRICTED, such as the GSI. 
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5.6 Security Infrastructure 
An eCAF implementation must be housed within a secure infrastructure.  We would 
expect organisations implementing eCAF to already have such an infrastructure so will 
not provide detailed guidance. 
An eCAF service infrastructure should conform to ISO17799, the eGovernment Security 
Framework and the Manual of Protective Security.  eCAF services should aim at meeting 
the security requirements for connection to the GSI or GSX, regardless of whether or not 
they do in fact connect. 
5.7 Summary 
Figure 5-1 below summarizes the required security services graphically. 
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Figure 5-1  Security Policy Summary 
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6. Interoperability and Usability 
In this chapter we discuss measures that can be taken to minimise the overhead of 
registering, administering and authenticating users.  The aim in all cases is to allow 
these overheads to be shared between organisations, thereby minimising duplication of 
effort and unnecessary cost. 
Note that this section is for guidance only.  
The previous sections define security requirements - but the precise technical solution to 
these requirements is dependant on local infrastructure and out of scope for this 
document.  
It will also be important to monitor the progress of other Every Child Matters initiatives, 
for example the IS Index. As these projects move towards technical design they too will 
define requirements and recommendations for security – and it will be important to 
maintain a compatible approach. 
6.1 Single Registration 
Chapter 4 specifies standards for checking identities and statuses before giving access 
to an eCAF implementation. 
The checking can be performed by the eCAF operator from scratch (and this will always 
need to be done for personal users).   
Sponsored users may, however, be bulk-registered by their sponsoring organisation.  
For this to be done, the sponsoring organisation must itself have its identity checked at 
level 3 and its procedures for checking new staff must meet the requirements of this 
security architecture.  In effect, the registration process is being delegated to the 
sponsoring organisation. 
In many cases, a child or carer will be known to a practitioner when an assessment is 
made and it would be unnecessary to perform a full registration check at that time.  It is 
also inadvisable to create an air of distrust by demanding full registration in every case.  
Therefore, the appropriate level of identity checking required is best left to the judgment 
of the individual practitioner.  Occasions where identity checks are more likely to be 
appropriate include: 
• Where a child or carer moves from one jurisdiction to another and is not known in 
the new jurisdiction. 
• Where a new actor with a claimed relationship to an episode (say, an estranged 
parent), asks for information about it. 
6.2 Single Administration 
Much of the actor-related information in an eCAF implementation will be a duplicate of 
other information already held and maintained elsewhere.  For instance: 
• Contact details.  This is likely to exist in HR and contact management systems. 
• User ID and credential (the password, certificate or token the user uses to logon).  
This is likely to exist in desktop and network security directories. 
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• Role, relationship and membership information.  This may exist in HR or security 
databases. 
eCAF implementations will in many cases wish to limit duplication and double-entry of 
data.  Here are some possible options: 
• Central administration (this is the basic case).  eCAF administration is done by a 
central eCAF team based on user requests.  eCAF administration is separate 
from desktop or other application administration.  This option is the simplest to 
set up but has operational disadvantages, in particular: 
o Keeping actor-related information up to date will be costly and data quality 
will suffer.   
o Users will have to manage multiple credentials which will result in cost 
overheads and a low overall level of security. 
o Where eCAF is being accessed by users in many organisations, complex 
communication links will have to be set up so that requests and 
responses can be passed between organisations.  Checking the origin of 
requests will create an additional overhead. 
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eCAF system
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UserseCAF
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Administration Requests
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Access
 
Figure 6-1  Central Administration 
• Delegated eCAF administration.  Administration is done by a central eCAF team 
independent of desktop and application administration.  However, the central 
eCAF team can delegate administrators in other organisations who will manage 
the users and parties within their organisation.  This resolves some of the inter-
organisation issues of central eCAF administration and is well supported by 
common user administration applications. 
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Figure 6-2  Delegated Administration 
• Repository synchronization.  Each organisation that uses eCAF will continue to 
maintain its user and party repositories as it does now.  Each organisation will 
arrange for its repositories to be synchronized with the eCAF repositories 
(periodically, or when a change is made).  This keeps eCAF up to date 
automatically and removes the user problem of managing multiple credentials.  
However it can be complex to set up securely and requires a high level of trust 
between the organisations involved. 
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Figure 6-3  Repository Synchronisation 
• Virtual repository.  Each organisation that uses eCAF will continue to maintain its 
user and party repositories as it does now.  The eCAF application will be 
configured to understand how to retrieve the information it needs from all of these 
repositories.  Again, this can require complex configuration and will rely upon the 
performance of the underlying repositories. 
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Figure 6-4  Virtual Repository 
• Federation.  Each organisation that uses eCAF will continue to maintain its user 
and party repositories as it does now.  Whenever a user makes a request, the 
user agent will send the request to eCAF along with enough information to allow 
eCAF to authenticate him and make access decisions (in practice, the user agent 
will usually engage in a secure dialog to do this).  This is in many ways the best 
solution but the technology to implement the idea securely is highly immature. 
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Figure 6-5  Federation 
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A single eCAF implementation may use different approaches with different attributes, or 
different user organisations. 
It is possible for eCAF implementations to share user repositories, thereby producing a 
single repository which is used by several different implementations.  In this case, all the 
issues and options described still apply. 
It is important that, where a master repository is being synchronized to a slave, the 
master must meet all the security requirements for the slave.  For instance, the master 
must meet at least as high a registration and authentication level as the slave. 
6.3 Single Sign-on 
Organisations are increasingly seeing a need to reduce the number of times a user 
needs to logon during a typical working day.  Practical schemes to achieve this include: 
• Session federation.  This involves sharing session information between 
applications or organisations using one of the schemes outlined in Section 6.2 (in 
most cases using the Federation scheme).  Again, the producer of session 
information must be working to at least as high a security level (measured by 
registration and authentication levels) as the slave. 
• Backend data synchronization.  If eCAF instances share data to the extent that 
they can give their users a full picture of what is happening in their area, then this 
will lessen the requirement for single sign-on. 
• Wallets.  These store credentials for numerous applications on a user’s 
workstation, and understand how to ‘impersonate’ the user’s role in logging on to 
each application.  These do not handle credential changes well, and can create 
integration and security problems; for this reason they are strongly deprecated for 
eCAF.   
6.4 Service Providers 
eCAF implementations can considerably simplify addressing the issues discussed above 
by using an existing access management service.  In effect, this outsources some 
proportion of the registration, administration and authentication task to the service. 
This paper will consider the following services: 
• Eduserve Athens. 
• GovConnect. 
• CJIT. 
The table below lists the services side by side for comparison. 
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Access Management Service Comparison (As at Nov 2005) 
 Athens GovConnect (separate services for 
citizens and employees). 
CJIT 
Managed by Eduserve DCA, supported by Bolton MBC Home Office 
Timescales Exists Probably 2006 Live by June 2006 
Existing user 
Populations 
3.5M in education and health Citizens: several million. 
Employees: none. 
450K in police, courts and 
young offender organisations. 
Registration 
Services 
Identity checks not performed. Citizens: Govconnect will perform L1 
identity check. 
Employees: LA would perform identity 
checks. 
Identity checks delegated to 
member organisations. 
Administration 
Services 
Classic Athens supports 
delegated administration. 
AthensDA supports repository 
synchronization. 
Athens Shibboleth supports 
federation through a SAML 
profile. 
Citizens: self service only. 
Employees: GovConnect would provide 
a root credential to the LA which would 
in turn administer its users locally.  
GovConnect may provide tools to assist 
LAs. 
Not certain whether non-LAs will be 
supported. 
Delegation and federation will 
be supported. 
Authentication 
Services 
Included. 
AthensDA provides a proprietary 
SSO service and Athens 
Shibboleth provides a 
standardized SSO service. 
Citizens: User authentication supported. 
Employees: authentication is by 
exchanging signed XML messages. 
Included. 
SSO is by LTPA cookie and 
federation. 
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Access Management Service Comparison (As at Nov 2005) 
 Athens GovConnect (separate services for 
citizens and employees). 
CJIT 
Standards Support Proprietary, SAML XML signature or SAML (TBD). LTPA, LDAP, SAML, WS-* 
Token Support In planning phase. In planning phase. Will be available over Internet. 
Connectivity 
Required 
Internet. Citizens: Internet. 
Employees: GCSX, should be 
accessible to 100% of LAs 
Internet, GSI, GSX or CJX 
Cost Each eCAF instance costs 
£1500 one-off and must pay 
£100 per accessing 
organisation. 
Each user organisation must pay 
£450/year for up to 100 users 
and £2 per user per year for 
each additional user. 
Unknown. TBD 
Security Athens is aimed at the lower 
security levels (level 1 on our 
scale). 
L1 today.  L2/3 sometime in the future. Aimed at the RESTRICTED 
protective marking (equivalent 
to Level 3 on our scale) 
 
 
Note that the situation regarding these service providers is evolving quickly. The information in the table above is 
provided for guidance and to indicate the kind of services available. However it is likely to go out-of-date and, in 
particular, GovConnect is currently undergoing a process of revision and change. It is recommended to check the 
latest situation and monitor on an ongoing basis. 
 
